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FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACTUAL
PURPOSE - DOCTRINE OR MYTH?
NICHOLAS R. WEISKOPF
INTRODUCTION
Should a contractual promise to pay for goods or services be
excused by operation of law because supervening events have de-
stroyed the utility of the bargain for the party slated to receive
them? Many will recall law classroom debate on whether the
bride-to-be must take and pay for her wedding dress even though
the prospective groom has met a sudden and tragic pre-nuptial
end, or on whether the blind person who suddenly recovers sight
must honor the commitment to pay for seeing eye lessons for his
dog. Does the bargain bind, even in the event of such exceptional
and unexpected supervening events?
The seemingly apparent answer, provided by the so-called
doctrine of frustration of purpose, is that the total or virtual
thwarting of a party's bargaining motivation due to exceptional
supervening circumstance should permit that party to avoid the
affected contract unless the parties have otherwise explicitly or
implicitly agreed. Such avoidance would typically be subject to
the obligation to compensate in restitution for part performance
already rendered to and received by the avoiding party.
Precisely defined, frustration of purpose is to be distin-
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Columbia College,
1966; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1969.
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guished from the concept of impossibility (or impracticability) of
performance. In a true case of frustration, it is not that either
party's performance has become impossible or significantly more
difficult than originally contemplated. Rather, the party seeking
discharge on frustration grounds (the paying party in the non-
barter transaction) can still do that which the contract requires,
but no longer has the motivation to do so which originally in-
duced its participation in the bargain.! So too, at least for pur-
poses of this article, frustration of purpose does not subsume
those instances where a party seeks discharge, or reformative
modification of obligations, on grounds that a contractual price
adjustment provision no longer serves its alleged essential pur-
pose of tracking market price or otherwise no longer permits
profitable use of the goods or entitlements to be supplied.2 Such
'See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 cmt. a (1979). As explained
in the comment, "[tihis Section deals with the problem that arises when a change in
circumstances makes one party's performance virtually worthless to the other, frus-
trating his purpose in making the contract. It is distinct from the problem of im-
practicability ... because there is no impediment to performance by either party."
Id.; accord Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp.
Co., 263 N.W.2d 189, 192-94 (Wis. 1978) (stating that although impossibility and
frustration are similar, performance of contract is not necessarily impossible or im-
practicable under frustration doctrine; rather commercial purpose is frustrated); see
also Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944) (holding that lessee was not ex-
cused from performance because government regulations merely restricted, not de-
stroyed, use of leased premises). As stated by the Lloyd court:
Although the doctrine of frustration is akin to the doctrine of impossibility
of performance ... since both have developed from the commercial necessity
of excusing performance in cases of extreme hardship, frustration is not a
form of impossibility even under the modern definition of that term, which
includes not only cases of physical impossibility but also cases of extreme
impracticability of performance .... Performance remains possible but the
expected value of performance to the party seeking to be excused has been
destroyed by a fortuitous event, which supervenes to cause an actual but
not literal failure of consideration.
Id. (citations omitted).
Cases of-this type are legion and often confuse concepts of cost impracticability
with frustration. Whether it is buyer or seller seeking relief, the firm decisional
trend is to refuse relief on assumption of risk and/or foreseeability grounds. See,
e.g., United States v. Southwestern Elec. Coop., Inc., 869 F.2d 310, 315-16 (7th Cir.
1989) (stating that misprojection of construction cost component of price for electric
power did not excuse requirements purchaser); United States v. Great Plains Gasi-
fication Assocs., 819 F.2d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that pipeline purchasers
of natural gas output were not excused because of allegedly unanticipated low en-
ergy prices); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265,
276-78 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that utility purchaser under long-term coal contract
was not excused even though escalated price of coal could not be passed through to
its customers); Waegemann v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 713 F.2d 452, 454-55 (9th
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cases involve possible cost impracticability, not the supervening
vitiation of the paying party's need, or perceived need, for the
bargain. It is fairly common, however, for the courts and com-
mentators to use the term "frustration" in cases where perform-
ance by the seller or service provider has become impossible (the
entire contract becomes "frustrated")3 and in cases where the
purpose of a key contractual provision itself has allegedly been
"frustrated,"4 but such references only serve to obscure.
Even within the definitional confines just presented, frus-
tration of purpose is recognized as doctrine in the treatises,5 in
the casebooks, in the hornbooks and in other legal references.
Both the First6 and Second Restatement of Contracts7 elevate
Cir. 1983) (holding that lessors were not excused under frustration doctrine when,
due to enactment of Proposition 13 in California, rentals linked to reduced assessed
property valuations fell significantly below fair rental value). But see, Aluminum Co.
of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). In that case, an
indexed pricing formula was reformed to prevent the seller from having to continue
to supply aluminum under a long-term contract at a significant loss. The decision,
popularly known as "ALCOA," alternately employed (or misemployed) principles of
mutual mistake, impracticability and frustration to reach a result which has been
roundly criticized. See, e.g., Beaver Creek Coal Co. v. Nevada Power Co., No. 89-
4114, 1992 WL 113747, at *4 (10th Cir., May 27, 1992); Southwestern Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 869 F.2d at 315 n.7 (stating ALCOA "is inapposite because it was purportedly
controlled by Indiana law" and has since "faded into obscurity.") (citations omitted);
Printing Indus. Ass'n v. International Printing & Graphic Communications Union,
584 F. Supp. 990, 998 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (stating disagreement with ALCOA decision
and rationale); Wabash, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 995, 999 n.6 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
3 In 1943, the British Parliament enacted legislation requiring a party whose
performance had become impossible to make restitution of down payment subject to
possible set-off for reliance expenditures. That legislation was called the Law Re-
form (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, ch. 40, § 1 (Eng.).
4 See, e.g., Molnar v. Molnar, 313 N.W.2d 171, 173-74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that where minor child died, former husband was not bound by terms of
property settlement, as incorporated in divorce judgment, requiring payment of half
of expenses of maintaining marital home until minor child attained age of 18); Nash
v. Board of Educ., 345 N.E.2d 575, 576 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that once statute ex-
tended probation period for teachers from three to five years, Board was not obli-
gated to satisfy provision of collective bargaining agreement, which required notifi-
cation of denial of tenure by May 1 of teacher's third year of service). While both of
these decisions referenced and purported to apply principles of frustration, they also
engaged in purpose construction.
5 See 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1353-61 (1962). Professor
Williston discusses frustration of purpose in Chapter 58 of his treatise, a chapter
which deals more generally with impossibility of performance. 18 SAMUEL WIL-
LISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 1954-55 (3d ed. 1978).
6 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 288 (1932); see infra notes 37-40 and
accompanying text (discussing same).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1979); see infra notes 89-95 and
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frustration of purpose to black letter status. Particularly in
more recent years, the highest and intermediate appellate courts
of many states have voiced recognition of the concept,8 often by
citing approvingly to Section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, which will be discussed in detail later in this article.9
It is only when one searches for decisional holdings squarely
based on frustration grounds that doubts emerge as to whether
we are dealing with true legal doctrine or shibboleth. Based on
the research summarized in this article, the inescapable conclu-
sion is that the courts typically do not permit purchasers of
goods and services to escape contractual liability because of su-
pervening frustration of bargaining objective unless, of course,
the parties are found to have so agreed.
If the conclusion just voiced is correct, very interesting is-
sues are presented. Why would the courts identify the frustra-
tion concept, pay lip service to its viability, and then virtually
always refuse to apply it? How does such a concept ingrain itself
so deeply into the legal literature under such circumstances?
Why are the courts, however willing to recognize frustration of
purpose in the abstract, so staunch in their refusal to use it as a
predicate for relief?
Part I of this article focuses on the very limited actual role
the frustration concept, as properly and strictly defined, has
played in the decisional calculus from the time of what is re-
garded as its earliest enunciation in the English Coronation
cases, through the present, a period spanning almost all of the
twentieth century. Part I will also explain how frustration has
emerged as a "pseudo doctrine" by demonstrating that many of
the cases referencing or regarded as invoking frustration of pur-
pose actually implicate conceptually distinct legal concepts.
Many of these cases deal with nothing more than failure of the
constructive condition of exchange to payment because the re-
quired counterparty performance has not been rendered due to
literal impossibility.' ° Still additional cases in this category,
many of which involved leases, are in turn merely examples of
judicial refusal on policy grounds to enforce contracts requiring
or actively contemplating party conduct which has become pro-
accompanying text (discussing same).
8 See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
9 See infra Part I(C).
'0 See infra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
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hibited by law.11 Absent one of these special factors, the
thwarting of contractual purpose by exceptional supervening
events has typically remained an unshared risk of doing busi-
ness. Finally, Part I discusses the basic "gap filler" status the
frustration concept currently enjoys under the Second Restate-
ment. If the absence of substantial frustration of purpose by ex-
ceptional supervening circumstance were truly recognized as an
implied at law condition to the remaining contractual obligations
of the adversely affected party, one would expect to see a broad-
ened and liberalized application of the frustration concept in the
cases decided in recent decades. The reality, however, is that
there has been no firm doctrinal trend elevating discharge for
frustration in fact to true "gap filler" status.
Part II of this article will identify and examine possible rea-
sons for judicial reluctance to apply the frustration concept.
Some of these reasons will already have been identified in the
discussion of cases in Part I. This section will also introduce
additional policy implications, and policy distinctions will be
drawn between the frustration concept and others, such as im-
possibility and mistake, which operate far more commonly as
bases for the avoidance of bargains.
I. STATE OF THE LAW
A. Krell v. Henry-The Coronation Cases
It is generally recognized that the frustration doctrine, as
contract law concepts go, is of recent origin. Discussion and pur-
ported application of frustration of purpose is found in a series of
English cases decided early in this century and dubbed the
"Coronation Cases." It is in these cases that the doctrine is said
to have been recognized for the first time. Of the "Coronation
Cases," Krell v. Henry' is by far the best known. Yet it can con-
vincingly be argued that Krell, while it involved frustration in
fact of the paying party's bargaining motivation, offers little if
any support for excusing performance in situations where per-
formance by both parties is still possible. Detailed discussion of
Krell is warranted, in part because it illustrates and discusses
the very concepts that have served as obstacles to broad applica-
"' See infra Part I (B)(2).
'2 2 KB. 740 (CA. 1903).
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tion of the frustration concept.
Following the typical fact pattern of the "Coronation Cases,"
Krell involved the hire of a flat along Pall Mall, London, for a two
day period during which processions for the coronation of King
Edward VII were scheduled to occur. 3 Defendant Henry was
found to have been induced by an announcement exhibited by
plaintiff in the windows of the flat to hire the rooms for the sig-
nificant sum of 752; 25£ had been paid as a deposit, with the
balance due two days before the processions were to commence."
The announcement stated that windows to view the coronation
festivities were for hire, and this was confirmed by plaintiff's
housekeeper upon defendant's inquiry.5 Correspondence con-
firming the hire ensued, but it made no reference to the corona-
tion. 6
When the coronation was canceled, defendant refused to pay
the remaining 502 of the contract price. 7 Such refusal was up-
held. 8 While it is certainly true in the vernacular that Henry's
purpose in hiring was frustrated, careful scrutiny of the Krell
opinion shows an analysis based on Krell's contractual perform-
ance as agreed becoming impossible due to the failure of a
shared basic assumption of the parties that the Coronation
events would proceed on schedule. 9
Treating the contract as one of "license to use rooms for a
particular purpose and none other,"' and hence finding that
timely holding of the processions was at the "foundation of the
contract"2' and thus regarded by both parties, the key conclusion
was that "both parties are discharged from further performance
of the contract."2 2 The plaintiff was no more obligated to make
the rooms available than was the defendant to pay for them, be-
cause the "non-happening [of the procession] prevented the per-
3 Krell, 2 KB. at 741. Many of those letting rooms along Pall Mall did so with
plans to erect temporary seating which would be sold to members of the viewing
public. See, e.g., Chandler v. Webster, 1 KB. 493 (C.A. 1904).
" Krell, 2 K.B. at 741.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
'" Id. at 754-55.
9Krell, 2 KB. at 745-47.
20 Id. at 750.
21 Id.
2Id. at 751.
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formance of the contract"' so as to discharge both parties. The
Krell decision is laced with references to Taylor v. Caldwell,24 the
classic precedent for the proposition that unanticipated destruc-
tion of a thing essential to performance as agreed creates an
implied at law excuse for non-performance. Indeed, much of the
judicial focus in Krell was on whether the rule of Taylor v. Cald-
well applied, at least by logical extension, to the cancellation and
postponement of the coronation processions.25
That Krell is not a case of true frustration analysis can be
seen directly from the fascinating discussion in the main opinion
itself. In Krell, the court conjured up what is known in some
classrooms as the "Derby Day" hypothetical, and, in so doing, di-
rectly suggested that the unanticipated thwarting of the contrac-
tual purpose of the paying party, even where obvious and known
to the counterparty, will not excuse payment so long as the coun-
terparty's performance remains possible. Under the hypotheti-
cal, a party wishing to go to Epsom racecourse for its famous
Derby race engages a cab at 10£, an "enhanced" price suggesting
and consistent with the special circumstances (shortage of
transport for special event versus shortage of vantage points for
Coronation). The race is canceled before the transport is to be
performed, but discharge of the parties does not result as in the
rooms-for-hire case before the court. The court reasoned:
[U]nder the cab contract, the hirer, even if the race went off,
could have said, "Drive me to Epsom; I will pay you the agreed
sum; you have nothing to do with the purpose for which I hired
the cab," and that if the cabman refused he would have been
guilty of a breach of contract, there being nothing to qualify his
promise to drive the'hirer to Epsom on a particular day.
Whereas in the case of the coronation, there is not merely the
purpose of the hirer to see the coronation procession, but it is
the coronation procession and the relative position of the rooms
which is the basis of the contract as much for the lessor as the
hirer; and I think that if the King, before the coronation day and
after the contract, had died, the hirer could not have insisted on
having the rooms on the days named. It could not in the cab
case be reasonably said that seeing the Derby race was the
foundation of the contract, as it was of the license in this case.
Whereas in the present case, where the rooms were offered and
2 Id.
24 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (MB. 1863).
Krell, 2 KB. at 743-48.
245
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taken, by reason of their peculiar suitability from the position of
the rooms for a view of the coronation procession, surely the
view of the coronation procession was the foundation of the con-
tract, which is a very different thing from the purpose of the
man who engaged the cab-namely, to see the race-being held
to be the foundation of the contract.26
A fair reading of Krell, then, is that the paying party's ulti-
mate ability to realize some portion of his or her manifest pur-
pose in contracting is not integral to the contract's enforcement
unless the parties evidence the shared objective intent to make it
such. Whether there has been such an evidencing is an essen-
tially interpretive inquiry. In Krell, the rooms were "offered and
taken" for a particular purpose, via principles of offer and accep-
tance, thus creating the failed "foundation of the contract" so
that "performance of the contract [was prevented]." 27 The corre-
spondence referencing the hire did not refer to the Coronation,
but extrinsic evidence had to be received "'to ascertain the na-
ture and qualities of the subject-matter of the instrument, or, in
other words, to identify the persons and things to which the in-
strument refers .... ,,28 These interpretive analyses, showing an
intended contract to hire rooms to view a particular event, point
to performance as agreed having become literally impossible.
The parties did not spell out this highly particularized purport in
their written correspondence, because neither party should "be
taken to have anticipated, and ought to have guarded against,
the event which prevented the performance of the contract."
29
Neither party, then, could be deemed to have assumed the risk of
destruction of the means of performance as agreed through si-
lence of correspondence regarding hire. The net result is a
"frustrated contract'"-the licenser's inability to perform excuses
both it and the licensee.
A companion decision to Krell, decided by the same three
law judges, supports the conclusion advanced that discharge of
the licensee's remaining payment obligation in that case was not
based on frustration of one party's purpose, but rather on the lit-
eral impossibility of performance as agreed which provoked the
frustration and was sufficient to discharge both parties. In
"Id. at 751.
27 Id.
2Id. at 753-54.
2Id. at 752.
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Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v. Hutton," defendant had hired a
steamboat so as to be able to view naval exercises to be held as
part of the Coronation festivities.31 Defendant's purpose in hir-
ing the steamboat was known to the plaintiff; indeed, that pur-
pose was expressly referenced in the parties' written contract.
32
Nonetheless, the King's Bench refused to excuse the defendant's
obligation to pay the charter fee, effectively finding that plaintiff
had not offered use of the boat for a particular purpose so that
plaintiffs contractual obligation was still possible to perform de-
spite the ensuing cancellation of the celebration.33 In finding
that contemplated use of the steamship was not at the contract's
"foundation," the King's Bench employed the same Derby Day
hypothetical it had used in Krell, and concluded that the charter-
ing of the steamship, unlike the licensing of the rooms in Krell,
fell within its parameters.34
B. American Authorities
The concept of frustration, used and misused, has been dis-
cussed in thousands of contract cases decided by American
courts. While a complete canvas, to the extent possible, is be-
yond the scope of this article, it is noteworthy that a detailed
survey of the case law published in 1953 concluded that "[a] care-
ful search [had] uncovered no instance in which an American
court of last resort [had] expressly followed the doctrine of frus-
tration in making its decision." 5 In another study, published in
1960, the conclusion was that relief for frustration of purpose
could be found in only twenty-nine published American decisions
from any court."
By the time of its promulgation in 1930, however, the First
Restatement of Contracts, in section 288, advocated discharge
for frustration of purpose, absent agreement to the contrary or
contributory fault, but only where the contractual "object or ef-
fect" at issue was "the basis on which both parties" had bar-
3' 2 MB. 683 (CA. 1903).
3' Id. at 683.
32 Id. at 684.
- Id. at 686-88.
Id. at 689, 691.
Arthur Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1, 1 (1953).
"" T. Ward Chapman, Comment, Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59 MICH. L.
REV. 98, 106 (1960).
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gained." Comment a to section 288, while adopting the Krell re-
quirement that the purpose frustrated be at the contract's very
foundation, nonetheless advocated possible discharge for frus-
tration even if "literal performance is still possible" by the coun-
terpartyY Section 288, then, as putatively clarified by comment
a, seemed to raise more questions than it answered.
According to comment a, frustration would not apply merely
because the motivation inducing the party seeking discharge to
enter the contract was known to the other. 9 Frustration would
apply only if that motivation was "so completely the basis of the
contract that, as both parties know, without it the contract
would have little meaning."4" If this caveat from comment a was
intended to require something more than that the claimed frus-
tration be total or close to total, its meaning was elusive. The
contractual manifestations of the party resisting discharge af-
firmatively linking its contractual performance to the achieve-
ment of a particular end by its counterparty receive no direct at-
tention in the comments to section 288. Such manifestations, in
cases like Krell, permit defining "performance as agreed" with
the breadth required to subsume the counterparty's contractual
purpose-the licenser was obligated to supply rooms from which
the coronation procession could actually be viewed. Thus, as
seen from the ensuing discussion, the presence of such manifes-
tations appeared to have a rather significant ongoing role in the
more chronicled of the earlier American decisions.
1. Representative Earlier Cases
For the most part, earlier cases commonly cited in support of
frustration of purpose as a ground for contractual discharge in-
3' RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 288 (1932). Section 288 provided:
Where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be attained by
either party to a contract forms the basis on which both parties enter into
it, and this object or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a promisor who is
without fault in causing the frustration, and who is harmed thereby, is dis-
charged from the duty of performing his promise unless a contrary inten-
tion appears.
Id.
38 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 288 cmt. a (1932).
" Id. Comment a specifically provided that "[i]t is not enough in order to make
the rule stated in the Section applicable, that one party to the contract has in view a
specific object or effect without which he would not enter into the contract, and the
other party knows this." Id.
40 Id.
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volved, instead, the literal impossibility of performance as
agreed caused by the supervening vitiation of what the English
courts, in the various Coronation cases, referred to as the
"foundation" of the contract.
Thus, for example, in two appellate opinions by the New
York courts in 1915, advertisers who were to pay for advertise-
ments in a yacht race souvenir program were held discharged
when the race was canceled because of World War IV' These
cases serve as the basis for Illustrations to the frustration formu-
42lations in both Restatements, and are referenced in the previ-
ously discussed Anderson survey as providing "probably the
strongest case law support the doctrine has ever had."43 How-
ever, in each of these cases, despite references to the frustration
in fact of the advertisers, the core reasoning employed by the
courts was that the "publication" required by the contract as in-
terpreted had been prevented by cancellation of the race. Both
decisions noted that the contemplated program was inextricably
linked to the events to which it related, and that a souvenir item
of the type contemplated by the contract "cannot recall what has
not taken place."' One of the opinions, eschewing a true frus-
tration of purpose analysis, noted:
This is not where a promisor has failed to guard himself against
a vis major. It is not a performance on one side, the other hav-
ing no appropriate clause to excuse default; but it is where the
situation, as it turns out, has frustrated the entire design on
which is grounded the promise. An advance issue of the pro-
grams cannot fairly be held to be what defendant was to pay for.
The object in mutual contemplation having failed, plaintiff can-
not exact the stipulated payment.45
A similar result was reached in an intermediate appellate
decision in California,46 which serves as the basis for Illustration
4 to the frustration formulation found in section 265 of Restate-
41 Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 156 N.Y.S. 179 (App. Div.
1915); Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. "Churchills", 153 N.Y.S. 264 (App. Term 1915); see
also Chapman, supra note 36, at 106 n.49 (citing additional lower court opinions
dealing with same facts).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 288, illus. 2 (1932); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265, illus. 2 (1979).
43 Anderson, supra note 35, at 7.
"Hotel Hermitage, 156 N.Y.S. at 180 (quoting "Churchills", 153 N.Y.S. at 265).
45 Id.
420th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman, 149 P.2d 88 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1944).
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ment (Second). In that case, a lessee of external neon signs for
its place of business was held relieved from its monthly lease
payments after an emergency war measure totally banned their
use other than in daytime hours, when their illumination was
useless.' The decision, while citing approvingly to section 288 of
the First Restatement, references the destruction of the very
means of required performance.48 Via interpretation, the lease
contract was deemed to be one for the ongoing provision of
lighted signage, a performance obligation on the part of the les-
sor prohibited by supervening legal enactment.49 Based on the
very type of impossibility of performance as agreed analysis em-
ployed in Krell, both parties were held discharged." Most inter-
estingly, the opinion cites approvingly and distinguishes an older
California case refusing relief to owners of a factory which had
contracted for the delivery of electricity to that factory's prem-
ises.5 A fire had destroyed the factory, and the supplier had
clearly known of the intended use of its product. Nonetheless,
performance as agreed in that case was merely "to deliver elec-
trical energy to a certain described piece of land irrespective of
its use."52 Thus defined, the supplier's performance remained
possible, and the frustration in fact of the purchaser was an in-
sufficient predicate for discharge.53
The same "impossibility of performance as agreed" analysis
was used by the Supreme Court of California in a 1928 decision'
which is the basis for Illustration 3 to the frustration of purpose
provision in section 265 of Restatement (Second). In that case,
under a contract to cover a period of more than three years, a ho-
tel was to pay a monthly fee to a golf and country club in return
for golfing privileges for its hotel guests.55 The hotel was de-
stroyed by fire, and remaining monthly contractual payments
47 Id.
4' Id. at 91-92.
'9 Id. at 92-93.
"o Id. at 92 (stating that upon regulation's enactment, "the contract was termi-
nated and both parties thereto were excused from further performance.").
" San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. v. Costaloupes, 274 P. 84 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1929).
52 20th Century Lites, Inc. v. Goodman, 149 P.2d 88, 93 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1944).
53 Id.
' La Cumbre Golf & Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 271 P. 476 (Cal.
1928).
" Id. at 476.
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were held excused.6 Both parties to the contract were deemed to
have intended and understood, at contract formation, that the
ongoing existence of the hotel and its guests was essential to per-
formance of the contract.57
Similarly, in a 1945 decision by the Seventh Circuit, an ex-
clusive licensee of a patented transmission used in the manufac-
ture of washing machines suffered frustration in fact when the
federal government promulgated a war measure banning said
manufacture.58 The court held that defendant's obligation to pay
a minimum royalty was discharged during the pendency of the
regulation, but that plaintiff could not cancel the exclusive li-
cense. 9 While citing approvingly to section 288 of the First Re-
statement, the court defined contractual performance as agreed
to be the permitting of continued use of the transmission device
in manufacture." Finding such performance as agreed to have
been rendered impossible by virtue of supervening illegality, the
court concluded that both parties were relieved of performance.6
Common to the decisions just discussed, and, in fact, most of
the additional earlier cases traditionally cited in support of frus-
tration of purpose, is the involvement of more than just frustra-
tion in fact of the paying party's essential motivation in entering
into a contractual bargain. 2 Common in these cases is reference
to destruction of the means of performance as agreed. To de-
termine "performance as agreed," courts have distilled the es-
sence or "foundation" of the contract at issue via interpretation
of shared party intent. The processes employed to determine
"performance as agreed" are precisely those used in cases more
squarely cubbyholed as precedents for the doctrine of impossibil-
ity/impracticability of performance. The results reached are no
doubt tinged by equitable considerations, but the dominant ra-
58Id. at 477.
57 Id. at 477 (holding that enforcement of contract would be "unreasonable and
contrary to the intent of persons situated as were the plaintiff and defendant at the
time this contract was entered into.").
" Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558, 559 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741
(1945).
69 Id. at 560-61.
60 Id. at 560 ("[T]he parties contracted for the continued use of the patented
transmission in the manufacture of washing machines .... ").
6' Id. (finding that "[iln such a case, neither party was bound to the performance
of the contract. Indeed, neither party could perform it.").
See case citations compiled and summarized in Anderson, supra note 35, at 5-
7, 9-14; see also, case citations compiled in Chapman, supra note 36, at 106-07.
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tionale for the relief provided, as noted by Professor Williston, is
really nothing more than a failure of consideration.63
"Performance as agreed" is that which was promised and sought
in return for payment.' Once such performance cannot be ren-
dered because of supervening events outside the control of either
party, both are discharged.65
Not yet discussed are the earlier cases involving frustration
in fact of a tenant's intended use of real property. These cases,
because they implicate principles of the law of real property as
well as principles of general contract law, are discussed sepa-
rately in the section to follow.
2. Lease Cases
Most of the earlier cases involved tenant obligations to pay
rent when supervening legal regulation, or other remote and
typically war-related contingency, prevented the use of the
premises contemplated at lease formation. In several such cases,
judicial refusal to relieve the tenant was based on the common
law conceptualization of a real property lease as a conveyance
subject to reversion, with the supervening inability to put the
property to contemplated use and the other attendant risks of
ownership passing to the conveyee during the lease term.6 Even
' WILLISTON, supra note 5, § 1954 at 129.
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 cmt. a (1979). Comment a
states:
Ordinarily when parties make [an agreement involving an exchange of
promises], they not only regard the promises themselves as the subject of
an exchange, but they also intend that the performances of those promises
shall subsequently be exchanged for each other. Even without a showing of
such an actual intention, a court will often, out of a sense of fairness, as-
sume that it was their expectation that there would be a subsequent ex-
change of the performance of each party for that of the other.
Id.
65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1979) (stating that where,
subsequent to contract formation, party's performance is made impracticable with-
out his or her fault by occurrence of event, non-occurrence of which was basic as-
sumption on which contract was made, his or her duty to render performance is dis-
charged absent language or circumstances indicating contrary).
"6 See generally, Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle
of Contract Remedies, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 26-27 (1991) (stating that traditional prop-
erty law holds tenant as true "owner" of property, thus placing risk on lessee during
lease term). The conception of the lessee's obligation to pay rent being absolute is
said to date back to Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (KB. 1647), which held that
a lessee outed from possession by an invading army was nonetheless bound to pay
rent. That decision, which effectively placed the risks of property ownership on the
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in those cases decided without reference to lease estate concepts,
the emerging trend was against grant of relief for lessee frustra-
tion."7
Until the early 1930s, the courts showed a certain willing-
ness to relieve a lessee where the sole commercial activity per-
mitted by the lease was or became illegal because of local or
state regulation or national prohibition of the sale of liquor."
Most of the decisions were by lower courts, and relief to the ten-
ant was typically predicated on "constructive eviction" or
"implied condition" without reference to frustration.69 By the
mid-1940s and thereafter, however, the cases generated by the
events of World War II were decidedly unreceptive to relief for
lessee frustration caused by direct and indirect governmental re-
straints on the commercial activity for which the premises had
been leased.0 Even when such relief was deemed theoretically
available, it was invariably denied where the lease permitted
any meaningful commercial use that was not totally banned by
wartime regulation.71 Both earlier and later cases also denied
lessee during the lease term absent express agreement to the contrary, has retained
an almost mystical precedential presence for centuries.
See Anderson, supra note 35, at 15-17. Professor Farnsworth, while discern-
ing general acceptance of the frustration concept by American courts, notes that
"[t]he judicial reluctance to excuse on the ground of frustration is most evident in
cases where lessees have sought to be excused on this ground." E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.7, at 724 (2d ed. 1990).
6' Many of these cases were decided in New York. See, e.g., Hart v. City Thea-
tres Co., 215 N.Y. 322, 330 (1915) (stating that where contract on its face offends
against statutes intended to promote public safety, courts will not enforce it); H.B.
Shontz Co. v. Laffay, 232 N.Y.S. 614, 617 (App. Div. 1929); Doherty v. Monroe Eck-
stein Brewing Co., 191 N.Y.S. 59, 62 (App. Div. 1921) ("It is well settled that a lease
of premises for an illegal purpose is void."). For additional older lease of realty
cases, see Anderson, supra note 35, at 15-17.
- See Shepard v. Sullivan, 162 P. 34, 35 (Wash. 1916) (stating that leases are
conveyances with conditions attached to them); Anderson, supra note 35, at 14
(concluding that twenty-one cases involving leases did not mention frustration of
purpose, but are consistent with doctrine).
o See Anderson, supra note 35, at 15 (summarizing such cases). But see Canrock
Realty Corp. v. Vim Elec. Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (stating that if
tenant is deprived by laws adopted after making of lease from using property for
purposes for which it was rendered, lease is terminated although other incidental
uses may be made thereof); Schantz v. American Auto Supply Co., Inc., 36 N.Y.S.2d
747, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (finding governmenfs prohibition of use of premises for
particular purpose, as specified in lease, sufficient against landlord's complaint for
rent).
7 See Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 52 (Cal. 1944); see also Frazier v. Collins,
187 S.W.2d 816, 817-18 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945) (finding that party should not be re-
lieved of obligations merely because supervening events rendered lease unprofit-
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relief where regulatory impediment was sufficiently foreseeable
at lease formation as to permit the inference that the tenant had
assumed the concomitant risks.72
Regarding those earlier cases which did purport to relieve
lessees, there is ample room to argue that the frustration analy-
sis, even when judicially employed, was superfluous. The domi-
nant reasoning utilized in many of these cases was that tenants
forbidden by law from putting demised premises to contemplated
use were absolved from further performance on grounds of su-
pervening illegality.73 Such was the prevalent reasoning em-
ployed in New York, the jurisdiction giving rise to such a signifi-
cant share of the so-called lease cases. The New York cases
hence refer to judicial refusal to enforce tenant obligations to pay
rent as furthering "the efficacy of a regulation designed for the
protection of property or human life,"74 to voidness for illegality,"
and to an implied condition in leases that change in law not ren-
der contemplated use illegal.76
Just as Krell v. Henry involved a license to use rooms for a
particular purpose and none other, the "frustration of lease"
cases just surveyed typically involved demises for specified com-
mercial purposes spelled out in use restriction provisions or oth-
erwise obvious from the structural nature of the improved
premises themselves. The premises had been offered by the
able); Wood v. Bartolino, 146 P.2d 883, 890 (N.M. 1944) (granting lessor rent when
government regulations did not completely deprive lessee of use of premises).
72 See, e.g., 56-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., 159 N.E.2d
150, 154 (N.Y. 1959) (denying relief where tenant failed to inquire about certificate
for occupancy); Raner v. Goldberg, 155 N.E. 733, 734 (N.Y. 1927) (stating that where
promisor knowingly chose to make absolute promise, he or she may not afterwards
claim relief because subsequent events show that choice was ill advised).
73 See, e.g., Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co., 191 N.Y.S. 59, 61 (App.
Div. 1921) ("When ... the principal use of the premises for saloon purposes became
unlawful, the lease became terminated by operation of law ... ."); Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 167 P. 58, 60 (Wash. 1917) (finding
that lease for use of premises for saloon cannot be enforced when sale of intoxicants
was made illegal).
74 Hizington v. Eldred Ref. Co. of New York, 257 N.Y.S. 464, 467 (N.Y. App. Div.
1932).
75 See H.B. Shontz Co. v. Laffay, 232 N.Y.S. 614, 617 (App. Div. 1929) (finding
that use of premises specified in lease was illegal and lease was void); see also, 56-70
58th Street Holding Corp., 159 N.E.2d at 156 (granting relief for tenant only where
it was "impossible" for tenant to put premises to legal use).
76 See Raner, 155 N.E. at 734 ("We assume for the purpose of this appeal that
where parties enter into a lease exclusively for a use which is not illegal when the
contract is made but such use becomes illegal by change of law, the lease is thereby
terminated.").
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landlord for a specific purpose and thus accepted. Once the lease
in question is treated as a lease to conduct a particular commer-
cial activity on the demised premises, supervening governmental
prohibition of that activity could be deemed to vitiate a truly
shared "foundation"-the contract's very subject matter. To the
extent that the lease is not treated as a one-shot conveyance, but
as an instrument creating an ongoing relationship of permitted
use and occupancy between the parties, that policy, of course, be-
came more readily applicable.
The older lease cases are hard cases to cubbyhole exclusively
under any particular doctrinal heading. Theoretically, and with
a heavy dosage of abstraction, one can divorce a leasing from
stipulated use of premises and conclude that the tenant's obliga-
tion to pay rent is, absent a covenant to use affirmatively the
premises at all, the tenant's sole obligation and one that remains
wholly possible to perform even though the leasehold interest is
valueless. One can pursue this analysis, overlook application of
the public policy against furtherance of contemplated illegal con-
tractual behavior, overlook effective destruction of the means of
"performance as agreed" (the ongoing provision by lessor and op-
eration of the premises by lessee for a particular purpose as
placed at the foundation of the bargain) by operation of super-
vening illegality, and conclude from the tenor of certain of the
decisions that frustration of purpose, however gratuitously, has
been chosen as the governing rationale if the tenant is to be dis-
charged. The reality, however, is that myriad legal forces are at
work in the lease cases and that they hardly stand for doctrinal
acceptance of frustration of purpose as a general principle of con-
tract law.
3. Sale of Goods
Many of the so-called frustration cases involving the sale of
goods are nothing more than price impracticability cases in
which one of the parties, typically without success, seeks relief
because the pricing adjustment mechanism under a long-term
contract wholly fails to track prevailing market price." To have
a true case of frustration in fact involving the paying party under
a goods contract, one must turn to those in which the buyer, due
to supervening circumstance, cannot put the goods to the use for
See cases cited supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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which they were purchased.
As the ensuing discussion reveals, the law has not been
prone to grant relief to frustrated buyers, except in those rare in-
stances where the intended use of the goods to be furnished un-
der the executory contract of sale was not only known to the
seller, but at the very "foundation" of the contract-an essen-
tially interpretive determination of shared party intent of the
type employed in Krell. A rationale often used to deny relief,
which also appears in various cases refusing to find lessee frus-
tration, is that complete or virtually complete frustration of pur-
pose is required for that defense to be available. A buyer cannot
establish complete frustration, so the reasoning goes, so long as
value can be derived from the goods through alternative use or
resale."8
Thus, it has been broadly recognized that the total inability
of a buyer to put goods to contemplated use, even because of su-
pervening government restriction on export or import, is the
buyer's risk unless the parties have agreed otherwise. In Swift
Canadian Co. v. Banet,79 a buyer of lamb pelts for use in its fac-
tory in Philadelphia was to take title to them in Canada. Super-
vening federal regulation completely prevented importation of
the pelts into the United States, but the buyer's frustration de-
fense was summarily rejected:
Even if the goods could not be imported into the United States
under the then existing regulations, the rest of the world was
free to the buyer, so far as we know, as destination for the
shipment. If he did not care to accept them under the circum-
stances and his expectation of a profitable transaction was dis-
appointed, nevertheless, the seller having performed or being
ready, able and willing to perform, was entitled to the value of
's See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265, illus. 5 (1979). The reason-
ing is as follows:
A contracts to sell and B to buy a machine, to be delivered to B in the
United States. B, as A knows, intends to export the machine to a particular
country for resale. Before delivery to B, a government regulation prohibits
export of the machine to that country. B refuses to take or pay for the ma-
chine. If B can reasonably make other disposition of the machine, even
though at some loss, his principal purpose of putting the machine to com-
mercial use is not substantially frustrated. B's duty to take and pay for the
machine is not discharged, and B is liable to A for breach of contract.
Id. 7224 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1955).
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his bargain.80
Buyers who, as sellers know, have purchased goods for the
sole purpose of export to a particular foreign country have been
unable to invoke frustration even where supervening regulation
forecloses such exportation."s So too, a buyer of goods for use in
its manufacturing process was denied a frustration defense even
where a fire subsequently destroyed its plant. 2
In the goods cases discussed and cited, it is evident that the
seller knew of the buyer's contemplated use at the time of con-
tracting, much as the celebrated hansom driver knew of his pas-
senger's intended destination in the Derby Day hypothetical.
Nevertheless, knowledge of intended use of goods is not enough
under the cases to make a buyer's ability to use them accordingly
a "foundation" of a goods contract.
The denial of relief to frustrated buyers is not necessarily
based on the buyer's ability to resell or make some secondary use
of the goods. Comment 9 to section 2-615 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code says the following about a buyer's supervening in-
ability to put goods to contemplated use:
Exemption of the buyer in the case of a "requirements" contract
is covered by the "Output and Requirements" section both as to
assumption and allocation of the relevant risks. But when a
contract by a manufacturer to buy fuel or raw material makes
no specific reference to a particular venture and no such refer-
ence may be drawn from the circumstances, commercial under-
standing views it as a general deal in the general market and
not conditioned on any assumption of the continuing operation
of the buyer's plant. Even when notice is given by the buyer
that the supplies are needed to fill a specific contract of a nor-
mal commercial kind, commercial understanding does not see
' Id. at 38.
"See Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103
(2d Cir. 1953) (holding that seller was entitled to retain damages from buyer's down
payment even though American government enacted regulation barring exportation
of printing presses to Russia without an export license and such license was re-
fused); Coker Int'l v. Burlington Indus., 747 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.C. 1990), affd, 935
F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that purchaser of used looms was not
entitled to return of deposit after Peruvian regulation blocked intended resale in
Peru); Pierson & Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 181 N.Y.S. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (directing ver-
dict for seller despite buyer's inability to secure license to export steel plates to Ja-
pan).
82 Sechrest v. Forest Furniture Co., 141 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. 1965) (explaining that
subject of contract was special manufacture of plywood drawer bottoms, which were
not burned).
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such a supply contract as conditioned on the continuance of the
buyer's further contract for outlet. On the other hand, where
the buyers contract is in reasonable commercial understanding
conditioned on a definite and specific venture or assumption as,
for instance, a war procurement subcontract known to be based
on a prime contract which is subject to termination, or a supply
contract for a particular construction venture, the reason of the
present section may well apply and entitle the buyer to the ex-
emption.83
Under the comment 9 approach, there is no frustration de-
fense unless the purchase of goods should be understood by both
parties to be conditioned upon the ongoing viability of a specific
project or venture. For example, in Chase Precast Corp. v. John
J. Paonessa Co., Inc.,' a subcontractor under contract to provide
concrete median barriers for a state highway construction project
sued the main contractor for lost profits on so much of their
supply contract as remained totally executory. The contractor,
pointing to the Commonwealth's unanticipated cancellation of
that portion of the project as would have required installation of
the barriers to be supplied by plaintiff, interposed the defense of
frustration." After findings that plaintiff knew that the barriers
were for the affected project, and that plaintiff knew of the
Commonwealth's conventional contractual reservation of power
to alter and eliminate project specifications, the defendant con-
tractor was held excused from paying plaintiffs lost, anticipated
profits.86 While section 265 of the Second Restatement was cited
in support of granting such excuse,87 the Supreme Judicial Court
also alluded to the possible incorporation by reference into the
subcontract of the Commonwealth's prerogative to alter or elimi-
nate portions of the overall project and to plaintiffs familiarity
with a practice in the construction industry whereby contract
items were paid for only on the basis of the quantities of work
actually accepted on the project at issue.88
Presumably, in the rare case in which there should be a
"reasonable commercial understanding" of the type discussed in
" Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615 cmt. 9 (1996).
84 566 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1991).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 607-08.
87 Id. at 606 (stating that Restatement's formulation was consistent with court's
treatment of impossibility of performance and frustration of purpose).
" Id. at 606-07.
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comment 9 that the sales contract is conditioned on a specific
project or venture going forward, the parties would be so charged
through use of interpretive processes. Absent express condition,
custom and usage or prior dealings could be so employed. Nei-
ther the cases nor Article 2 of the Commercial Code would ap-
pear to invite "gap filling" as a matter of law to excuse a buyer's
performance because some remote, supervening contingency
prohibits or seriously impedes intended use of goods.
C. Restatement (Second) of Contracts
At this juncture, and before turning to recent case law dis-
cussion of the "frustration doctrine," it becomes useful to focus on
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the "Restatement")
overall treatment of that subject. Chapter 11 of the Restatement
treats impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose
as tandem concepts, placing each squarely in the realm of inher-
ent judicial power to do what justice requires by way of relieving
contractual obligation where extraordinary circumstance so re-
quires. The Restatement approach goes far beyond that of im-
plementing the shared intention of the parties as interpreted.
As stated in the Introductory Note to Chapter 11, "[e]ven where
the obligor has not limited his obligation by agreement, a court
may grant him relief."89
Section 265 of the Restatement, headed "Discharge by Su-
pervening Frustration," reads in full text:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of
an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render
performance are discharged, unless the language or the circum-
stances indicate the contrary.90
Comment a to section 265, after distinguishing frustration
from impracticability, reiterates and particularizes the require-
ments for what it calls "the rule" of frustration to apply:
First, the purpose that is frustrated must have been a principal
purpose of that party in making the contract. It is not enough
that he had in mind some specific object without which he
would not have made the contract. The object must be so com-
'9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS ch. 11 (1979).
Id. § 265.
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pletely the basis of the contract that, as both parties under-
stand, without it the transaction would make little sense. Sec-
ond, the frustration must be substantial. It is not enough that
the transaction has become less profitable for the affected party
or even that he will sustain a loss. The frustration must be so
severe that it is not fairly to be regarded as within the risks that
he assumed under the contract. Third, the non-occurrence of
the frustrating event must have been a basic assumption on
which the contract was made.91
The Restatement couples its broad embrace of the frustra-
tion concept with a broad view of judicial power to modify, rather
than wholly discharge, a frustrated party's contractual obliga-
tion. Additionally, it authorizes the award of not only restitu-
tion, but compensation for pre-supervening event reliance, so as
to fully and equitably adjust the post-supervening event circum-
stances in which the parties find themselves. These matters are
covered by section 272, which is designed to deal with situations
of impossibility/impracticability as well.92 Comment c to section
272 again cements the Restatement's treatment of both imprac-
ticability and frustration as creating situations inviting courts to
supply omitted terms (gap fillers), not necessarily on an "all or
nothing" basis, to discharge or temper contractual obligation
which cannot be so treated under principles of interpretation
designed to identify actual party intent:
c. Supplying a term to avoid injustice.
Under the rule stated in section 204, when the parties have
not agreed to a term that is essential to a determination of
their rights and duties, the court will supply a term that is
reasonable in the circumstances. Since it is the rationale of
this Chapter that, in a case of impracticability or frustra-
tion, the contract does not cover the case that has arisen,
the court's function generally can be viewed as that set out
in section 204 of the Restatement of supplying a term to
93deal with the omitted case.
9' Id. § 265 cmt. a.
92 Section 272 provides:
Relief Including Restitution
(1) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, either
party may have a claim for relief including restitution ....
(2) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter..., the
court may grant relief on such terms as justice requires including pro-
tection of the parties' reliance interests.
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272 cmt. c; see also U.C.C. § 2-615
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Each of the Illustrations to section 265 that purport to apply
frustration of purpose is in fact drawn from a case in which not
only the paying party's bargaining motivation, but also the coun-
terparty's "performance as agreed," was thwarted by unantici-
pated future events.94 The underlying decisions are those essen-
tially involving "frustrated contracts," rather than the mere
frustration of one party's bargaining motivation.
The current Restatement treatment, it must be reiterated,
purports to authorize discharge for frustration when both par-
ties' "performance as agreed" remains entirely feasible. The ap-
proach advocated by section 265 requires discharge for unilateral
frustration-in-fact, posed by otherwise unallocated risk, as jus-
tice requires. This invites application in cases where impossibil-
ity of contractual performance as agreed does not present itself
in tandem. In looking at fairly recent cases which cite section
265 with approval or which otherwise reference "frustration," we
see that actual holdings rarely provide relief for mere frustra-
tion-in-fact on a "gap filling" theory.
D. Recent Illustrative Cases
While there are too many relatively recent cases referencing
"frustration" to discuss them all, a careful look at a fairly broad
representative sampling reinforces the notion that a party
showing nothing more than unilateral frustration-in-fact is
highly unlikely to be even partially excused from contractual
performance. A good number of cases voice doctrinal allegiance
to the frustration concept, only to deny the defense on grounds of
foreseeability,"5 contributory fault, "6 and/or the absence of vir-
cmt. 6 (1994). Under comment 6, which deals with "impracticability" of performance,
additional support is found for a court's power to adjust rather than negate per-
formance obligations "[i]n situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by
either answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of 'excuse' or 'no excuse' ..... Id.
9' Comment a to section 265 contains six Illustrations drawn with some modifi-
cation from actual cases cited in the Reporter's Notes. The first four such Illustra-
tions are designed to show when relief for frustration-in-fact should be available.
Illustration 1 to section 265 is based on Krell v. Henry, a case involving the
"destruction of the means of performance as agreed." See supra notes 12-29 and ac-
companying text. Illustration 2 to section 265 is based on the so-call souvenir yacht
race program cases, shown to involve the literal impossibility of performance as
agreed. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. Illustrations 3 and 4 to sec-
tion 265 are based on two California decisions discussed in the text accompanying
notes 46-53 and 54-57. The arguement that both these cases involve literal impos-
sibility, as opposed to mere frustration in fact, is developed in the cited discussions.
Particularly under an "omitted term approach, lack of foreseeability of su-
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tually total frustration-in-fact. 7
In those rather infrequent decisions which purport to dis-
charge contractual obligation on frustration grounds, other de-
fenses to non-performance are often present as well, such as mu-
tual mistake.98 Thus, in an intermediate appellate decision in
Minnesota,99 which also referenced section 265 of the Second Re-
statement, a city's attempt to collect on contractual payments
from private landowners which were intended to defray part of
the costs of public improvements to their land was denied on the
theory that defendants' purpose had been frustrated when the
pervening events often explains a failure by the parties to provide for those events
in their contract. Where events provoking frustration in fact were foreseeable, the
normal presumption is that had the parties been amenable to excusing performance
because of them, they would have so provided. E.g., Arabian Score v. Lasma Arabian
Ltd., 814 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Arizona law); Columbian Nat'l Title
Ins. Co. v. Township Title Servs., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 796, 804 (D. Kan. 1987)
(applying Kansas law) (citing section 265); VJK Prod., Inc. v. Friedman/Meyer Pro-
ductions, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 916, 920-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying New York law)
(citing section 265); O'Hara v. State, 590 A.2d 948, 953-54 (Conn. 1991) (applying
federal law) (citing section 265).
See, e.g., Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 103 (3d
Cir. 1986) (stating alternate ground for denial of relief under Pennsylvania law)
(citing section 265); Rivas Paniagua, Inc. v. World Airways, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 708,
714-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying New York law and holding that airline was still
liable to publisher for terminating in-flight magazine contract even though airline
had canceled flights); Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chicago &
N.W. Transp. Co., 263 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Wis. 1978) (holding that attendant was not
excused from performance where defendant contributed to frustrating event) (citing
tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
97 See, e.g., Karl Wendt Farm Equip. Co., v. Int'l Harvester Co., 931 F.2d 1112
(6th Cir. 1991) (finding, under Michigan law, defense of frustration of purpose un-
available to defendant where primary purpose of agreement was not frustrated);
United States v. Grayson, 879 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating defendant could
not claim substantial frustration of purpose where plaintiff fully performed) (citing
section 265); Arabian Score, 814 F.2d at 531, 532; Dudley v. St. Regis Corp., 635 F.
Supp. 1468, 1471 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (applying Missouri law and citing section 265);
Downing v. Stiles, 635 P.2d 808, 814-15 (Wy. 1981) (citing tentative draft of Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts).
" See West Los Angeles Inst. for Cancer v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225-26 (9th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1010 (1967). In this case, the Mayer family, pursu-
ant to Oregon law, was held entitled to rescission of a sale and leaseback of their
business assets on grounds that an Internal Revenue Ruling had unexpectedly de-
prived them of capital gains treatment on leaseback proceeds. Id. at 223. While the
decision deals mainly with frustration, the court also emphasized that the head of
the Mayer family sought pre-contractual assurances from the defendant Institute
that the business property would be returned if underlying tax assumptions based
on the perceived state of the law were challenged, and that such assurances were
given. Id. at 225-26 n.10. The decision thus had interpretive elements, and also in-
volved a possible mistake of law.
City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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Army Corp of Engineers unexpectedly stopped the industrial de-
velopment planned by the city for the affected properties. An al-
ternate ground for the decision was that of mutual mistake-
both parties had mistakenly concluded prior to contract forma-
tion that all requisite federal permits for the industrialization
project had been obtained.1"'
In other recent decisions regarded as granting relief for frus-
tration, there appear to be overriding special equities. For ex-
ample, in Howard v. Nicholson,0 ' an intermediate appellate
court from Missouri purported to excuse an owner on frustration
grounds from paying its contractor's lost profits on work yet to be
performed. A long-term tenant for a commercial building to be
constructed to meet the tenant's particularized needs had, unex-
pectedly, gone bankrupt. 2 The court, after noting that the ap-
plicability of the frustration doctrine in Missouri was a matter of
first impression, emphasized that the contractor not only knew
of the contemplated building's highly particularized intended use
by that tenant, but had also directly solicited that tenant's par-
ticipation in the project, much as the licensor in Krell had solic-
ited the taking of rooms for a particular purpose.0 3 The court, as
an alternate ground for the decision, also found evidence that the
contractor would not have been able to comply with important
contractual time deadlines in any event."°
So too, in Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Con-
crete, Inc.,"'0 the Supreme Court of Washington used frustration
as the basis to excuse a lessee of strip mining rights from having
to pay certain of the minimum, annual royalties required by the
lease. The court found that sustained public and regulatory re-
sistance to strip mining had radically increased the anticipated
difficulty in securing the requisite permits, so that the failure to
do so justified the lessee's abandonment of the mineral lease-
hold.' The court further found that the lessee's purpose in en-
tering the lease had formed "the basis on which both parties en-
tered the [contract]." 7 Indeed, lessor had provided lessee with
"' Id. at 175-76.
101 556 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
102 Id. at 478-79.
"o3 Id. at 481, 483.
"o Id. at 480.
los 637 P.2d 647 (Wash. 1981).
"o Id. at 650-51.
107 Id. at 650.
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studies showing the leasehold to be rich in minerals, had under-
taken to secure a use permit for lessee, and had pledged its ac-
tive assistance in securing zoning and environmental permits
which were not forthcoming after years of effort.0 8 The court
also referred to evidence at trial that lessor had not provided the
requisite assistance to lessee in connection with securing certain
of the required permits. 9
In another decision by the Supreme Court of Washington,
hop producers who had contracted to purchase allotments, as
was required by federal regulation before they could lawfully
market their crops, were granted rescission against the seller of
the marketing allotments on frustration grounds because of re-
peal of the sales quotas creating the need for the allotments."0
The court relied on section 265 of Restatement Second, but also
placed emphasis on seller's failure to specify that the allotments
were being sold on an "as is" basis despite the foreseeability of
the regulatory changes that ensued.'
At first blush, the four state court decisions just discussed
would appear to have little in common. With the benefit of a bit
of massaging, however, each transmutes into a case of impossi-
bility of performance as agreed-an undertaking by a city to
supply improvements integral to an industrialization project
stopped dead in its tracks by federal governmental interven-
tion;" 2 an undertaking to build a commercial premises for the
use of a specific, pre-identified long-term tenant which has sub-
sequently gone bankrupt and is out of business;"3 an undertak-
ing to provide leasehold rights permitting the ongoing extraction
of minerals where the anticipated difficulty in securing the req-
uisite permits was radically increased;" and an undertaking to
supply marketing allotments under a regulatory sales quota sys-
tem abrogated by repeal of regulation."5 Nonetheless, these
10' Id. at 649.
109 Id.
110 Washington State Hop Producers, Inc. v. Goschie Farms, Inc., 773 P.2d 70
(Wash. 1989).
'' Id. at 73, 75-76.
"2 City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); see supra
notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
' Howard v. Nicholson, 556 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); see supra notes
101-04 and accompanying text.
114 Weyerhaeuser Real Estate Co. v. Stoneway Concrete, Inc., 637 P.2d 647
(Wash. 1981); see supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
" Washington State Hop Producers, Inc. v. Goschie Farms, Inc., 773 P.2d 70
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cases do evidence a degree of acceptance of the frustration con-
cept, but only where the particular or special use of the service
or entitlement purchased is jointly and actively contemplated by
both contractual parties engaged in a project-oriented or collabo-
rative endeavor.
II. FURTHER ANALYSIS-IS JUDICIAL
RELUCTANCE TO APPLY FRUSTRATION JUSTIFIED?
Discussion thus far points to the lack of widespread deci-
sional support for the frustration of purpose concept, so much so
that the temptation is to dismiss the notion that mere frustra-
tion in fact, even if substantial, is sufficient to discharge a con-
tractual obligation of payment. Such notion comes closer to be-
ing a legal chimera than it does to being doctrinal.
An attempt has also been made to demonstrate that most of
the commonly cited cases purporting to grant relief for frustra-
tion involve situations in which "big bang" supervening circum-
stance has not only posed a frustration in fact, but an insur-
mountable obstacle to the counterparty's practical or legal
wherewithal to render performance as agreed. By posing as such
an obstacle, supervening circumstance serves to vitiate the very
foundation or raison d'etre of the contract as it should be under-
stood by both parties.
Put another way, it is only when both contractual parties
had reason to understand at contract formation that the ex-
traordinary contingency which thereafter occurs would vitiate
their contract that discharge becomes appropriate. Finding the
basis for such a shared understanding is an interpretive en-
deavor guided by objective theory. The question is, what did the
parties have reason to understand given their bargaining and
other contractual manifestations to one another, prevailing cus-
tom and usage, other dealings and, of course, the language of
agreement employed?
To refer to such judicial interpretive inquiry as potentially
giving rise to an "implied term" of a contract excusing payment
because of exceptional post-contractual occurrence has the po-
tential to obscure, unless it is understood that the process is one
of implication in fact designed to vindicate party intent. The
(Wash. 1989); see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
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cases simply do not reconcile with the Second Restatement's po-
sition that relief for frustration involves the plugging of a con-
tractual "gap" created by exceptional supervening circumstance
with an implied at law term excusing performance where judicial
perceptions of what is "just" (as opposed to intended) so dictate.
The conclusion that the parties did not foresee, or otherwise
failed to specifically provide for exceptional supervening events,
need not mean that there is any sort of "omitted case" or "gap"
requiring judicial closure. Nothing prevents parties from formu-
lating and implementing an intent to excuse performance should
the unanticipated occur. Particularly in the relatively sophisti-
cated transaction, parties routinely resort to force majeure
clauses to absolve or temper performance obligations. Such
clauses often cover and describe foreseeable special circum-
stances with precision; but such clauses also typically, and far
more generally, cover circumstances "outside" of the "reasonable
control" of one or both parties."' Under contracts containing
such language, lack of foreseeability or remoteness of superven-
ing contingency does not bespeak any sort of omitted case. In-
deed, in various cases, party delimitations on force majeure yield
the interpretive inference that the parties did not intend to ex-
cuse performance for contingencies left uncovered by the lan-
guage of agreement employed."7
It is also possible, of course, for exceptional supervening cir-
cumstance to present situations which cannot be said to be
"covered cases"-cases as to which the contract, even with the
" In goods cases, the tendency has been to treat this type of exculpatory boi-
lerplate as covering unspecified, unforeseeable supervening contingencies of a type
which would create impracticability under section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. See, e.g., International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d
879, 884-85 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986) (noting effect of force
majeure provision was to excuse party from enforcement where failure or delay in
performance resulted from fire, flood, act of god or government intervention); East-
ern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 957 (5th Cir. 1976)
(excusing defendant from performance where government intervention came within
terms of excusable delay clause).
.17 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 281-86, n.63 (1985); see also Northern Indiana Public
Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that
long-term supply contract providing for price escalation to track market but making
no such provision for market price declines, required interpretive inference of allo-
cation of risk to buyer so that neither force majeure clause, nor doctrines of imprac-
ticability or frustration, can apply).
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aid of interpretive inference, is truly silent. But this realization
also begs the true question of whether prevailing doctrine invites
the court, under the guise of implication as a matter of law, to
supply a term excusing performance by the frustrated party. To
some, such process would involve judicial rewriting of a contract
to temper performance obligation expressed in absolute terms; to
others, the absence of a "covered case" serves as a complete de-
fense to accusations of judicial tampering.
What the debate really boils down to is whether the law is to
treat contractual obligations as absolute despite frustration in
fact unless interpretive disciplines yield an actual shared party
intent to the contrary. There are, of course, recognized excep-
tions to pacta sunt servanda. For instance, the law has long con-
templated avoidance of contracts that are the product of central
and mutual mistake as to the true nature or important qualities
of that which is to be purchased and supplied."' Similarly, when
basic misassumption occurs as to what the contractual future
will bring, the law has long resorted to implied at law terms,
said by the Taylor v. Caldwell line of authority to be consistent
with the presumed intent of the parties. In these instances, per-
formance is excused which has become literally or virtually
"impossible" because of the death or disability of the personal
services provider, the destruction of a thing essential to perform-
ance, or supervening illegality. The cases are much more stingy
where the paying party can show nothing more than a defensible
but ultimately wrong assumption that goods, services or other
entitlements could and would be put to profitable contemplated
use. Rarely, if ever, is such showing alone sufficient predicate
for the supplying of a term or condition excusing the obligation to
pay.
In the literature, various rationales are proffered for per-
ceived judicial reluctance to invoke frustration of purpose as a
defense."' Certain commentaries, for instance, emphasize that
18 The traditional casebook illustration of this principle is Sherwood v. Walker,
33 N.W. 919, 923-24 (Mich. 1887) in which the seller avoided its contractual obliga-
tion to part with a valuable breeding cow upon discovery of the parties' mutual and
mistaken belief that the cow was barren. See also Beachcomber Coins, Inc. v. Bosk-
ett, 400 A.2d 78, 80 (N.J. Super. 1979) (holding that purchaser could rescind con-
tract for purchase of coin upon finding of mutual mistake as to genuineness of coin).
1o See Steven A. Beckleman & David J. Adler, Forestalling Apocalypse: Con-
tracting Defenses to Foreclosure, 113 BANKING L.J. 53 (1996) (stating that applica-
tion of frustration of purpose would render "primary purpose" analysis under Re-
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the non-frustrated party may well have uncompensated reliance
injuries which the law will not compensate or allocate between
the parties.2 ' While some of the perceived "all or nothing" con-
straints on doing essential justice in tough situations are real,
this line of argument fails to reconcile the decisional authorities
and statutes which, for instance, excuse the seller who cannot,
for reasons beyond its control, deliver identified or other goods to
the relying buyer but refuse to excuse the buyer suffering what
in reality is total frustration in fact. The seller who cannot de-
liver because of destruction of its plant, destruction of its desig-
nated supply source, or export or import restriction is typically
excused even where the buyer has materially and detrimentally
changed position in contemplation of receipt of the goods. 2'
Moreover, relief for impossibility/impracticability, which is gen-
erally recognized as being more readily available than relief for
frustration, 22 is typically granted even where it is obvious that
the paying party will have to spend more to secure substitute
performance elsewhere.
An alternate explanation advanced for judicial reluctance to
discharge contractual payment obligations because of frustration
in fact is the law's reluctance to treat misassumptions and mis-
statement meaningless by implying "mutual profitability" as primary purpose in
every contract); Randal Owings, Output Contracts and the Unreasonably Dispropor-
tionate Clause of § 2-306, 59 MO. L. REV. 1051, 1062 (1994) (noting courts' reluc-
tance to apply frustration of purpose where "explicit assignment of risk" exists);
Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contract as a Relationship Management Form, 47
RUTGERS L.J. 1271, 1360 (1995) (noting that exoneration from liability under frus-
tration of purpose does not logically encourage maintenance of relationships be-
tween parties in dispute).
120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(2) (1979), discussed supra
at note 92. This section authorizes courts to award reliance-based compensation
where necessary to "avoid injustice" potentially posed by complete contractual dis-
charge for frustration. The cases, however, offer little if any support for such an ap-
proach. See generally, W.F. Young, Half Measure, 81 COLuM. L. REV. 19, 30-34
(1981) (discussing division of losses in mistake and impracticability cases).
'2 The potential for leaving reliance injury uncompensated upon discharge of
contractual duty for impossibility is, of course, not unique to goods cases. In cases
like Taylor v. Caldwell, the party denied enforcement will typically incur such in-
jury. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
m FARNSWORTH, supra note 67, at 722. "Furthermore, despite the similarity of
the requirements for the two doctrines, courts have been much more reluctant to
hold that a party has been excused on the ground of frustration than on the ground
of impracticability." Id.; accord, JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS 561 (3d ed. 1987) (stating that "[i]t seems to be widely believed that
the courts are more inclined to sustain a defense of impossibility than one based
upon frustration.").
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projections as to the future, whether conscious or subliminal,
with any great sympathy. Permitting avoidance for crucial mis-
take as to the true facts existing at contract formation not only
rectifies the imbalance of the resulting exchange but also impli-
cates principles of assent. This is particularly evident where the
mistake is truly shared (no "meeting of the minds" in the subjec-
tive sense) or otherwise mutual in the sense that one party knew
or had reason to know of the mistake of the other (so that the
mistaken party cannot be said to have assented in the objective
sense). Permitting avoidance, or discharge, for failure to antici-
pate future events, it may be argued, would have nothing to do
with failure of true assent at contract formation.
Indeed, the law is generally only a bit more inclined to grant
relief for purely unilateral mistake than it is for unilateral frus-
tration in fact. Under the unilateral mistake formulation of sec-
tion 153 of Restatement (Second), a party not knowing or having
reason to know of the other's material mistake faces avoidance
only where enforcement would be substantively unconscion-
able.' Comment a to section 153 concedes that "[clourts have
traditionally been reluctant to allow a party to avoid a contract
on the ground of mistake, even as to a basic assumption, if the
mistake was not shared by the other party."124 Additionally,
Comment d to section 153 notes that reliance by the non-
mistaken party may preclude avoidance for unilateral mistake
"although enforcement would otherwise be unconscionable."125
In any event, distinctions between mistake as to the current
facts and basic misassumption as to the future do not explain
why the law avidly embraces supervening impossibility as a legal
excuse but not supervening frustration. The explanation for this
phenomenon may be linked to the notion that the treatment of a
failure to perform as a breach creates monetary liability posing
as a disincentive to breach. The law thereby encourages per-
formance of contractual promises. But when performance is im-
possible, so the reasoning would go, there is nothing to encour-
age.
When supervening events, however, have instead eroded
pre-existing incentive to perform that which remains possible,
the need for "extra-contractual" incentive, in the form of liability
'2' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979).
'2 Id. § 153 cmt. a.
'2 Id. § 153 cmt. d.
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for damages, is arguably at its strongest. Parties rarely require
judicial incentive to act out bargains which remain beneficial to
all concerned under circumstances existing at the time for per-
formance.
Where performance remains possible, as would be true in
contract cases involving nothing more than unilateral frustration
in fact, the issue posed is really that of permissible "pain
threshold-at what point, if any, should performance be excused
because of supervening vitiation of the motive inducing the bar-
gain from the standpoint of the frustrated party? When the con-
trolling question is put in this way, concepts of frustration and
cost impracticability evidence a very real overlap. Both concepts
may then be seen to deal with the same sort of hardship, the un-
anticipated loss of the fancied worth or profitability of the po-
tentially enforceable bargain. In a very real sense, the frus-
trated party who is no longer in a position to realize value for its
payment faces the prospect of financial injury no different from
that confronting the performing party who cannot perform ex-
cept at substantial economic loss.
If one presses on with this "pain threshold" analogy, the
sometimes curious symmetry of the law, steeped in the relative
constancy of underlying fundamental human judgments, is
seemingly reasserted. The frustrated party refusing payment
faces a loss, in the form of damages, which will not exceed the
contract price and which will often be considerably less because
of mitigation stemming from the substitute transaction the per-
forming party is now able to undertake. The performing party,
pointing to an unanticipated increase in the cost of its perform-
ance less than or even equal to the contract price, is no more a
likely candidate for judicial relief than is the frustrated paying
party."' Such judicial reluctance ties in neatly with the idea
"6 Both Williston and Corbin acknowledged the traditional reluctance of Ameri-
can courts to excuse a performance made significantly more expensive than antici-
pated by supervening circumstance. WILLISTON, supra note 5, §1554; CORBIN, supra
note 5, § 1360.
In the litigation provoked by the wartime closure of the Suez Canal in late 1956,
impracticability defenses resting on the increased cost of performing contracts of
transport via alternate shipping route did not fare well. In American Trading &
Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972), additional ex-
pense of almost $132,000 against a contract price of approximately $417,000 was
held "not sufficient to constitute commercial impracticability under either American
or English authority." Id. at 942. The court then cited a number of British "Suez"
cases, including Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noblee Thorl G.m.b.H., [1960] 2 Q.B. 318,
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that courts would best leave disparities between contractual ob-
jective and contractual realization caused by unavoidable super-
vening circumstance as they fnd them, in part because forced
judicial reallocation of these so-called "windfall" disparities is of
little social or economic utility and could serve as a disincentive
to parties who would otherwise be inclined to allocate such dis-
parities for themselves.
In the end, viable legal principles governing excuse from
contractual obligation must comport with prevailing commercial
understanding. The basic human instinct is that one should
normally not be responsible for the non-performance of an act
rendered impossible without his fault. Decisional law, the desir-
ability of contractual certainty, and the commercial mores impli-
cated by risk allocation, suggest the contrary where the excuse
proffered for non-performance is merely one of frustration in
fact. However sad her predicament, the bride in the Wedding
Dress Hypothetical should not be excused from her contract with
the dressmaker.
348, affd, [1962] AC., 93 (1961), in which the House of Lords refused relief even
where freight costs were doubled by closure of the Suez Canal. In Transatlantic Fin.
Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966), alleged added expense bring-
ing the cost of performance almost $44,000 beyond the contract price of approxi-
mately $306,000 was also held insufficient. Said the court, "While it may be an over-
statement to say that increased cost and difficulty of performance never constitute
impracticability, to justify relief here must be more of a variation ... ."Id. at 319.
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 826 F.2d 239 (4th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988), the issue was whether defendant
ought be compelled to dispose of spent nuclear fuel by long-term storage when the
only method of disposal contemplated and available at contract formation was re-
processing. The court first aptly distinguished the Suez cases by noting that long-
term storage, unlike use of an alternate transport route in the Suez cases, was not a
foreseeable and reasonable alternate means of performance. Id. at 276. The Court
further noted, however, in excusing Westinghouse on what could have been left as a
literal impossibility analysis, that compelling Westinghouse to store spent fuel once
storage facilities existed in the future would result in a "cost" (loss?) to Westing-
house of "at least well over $80,000,000" as opposed to a contemplated profit of
$18,000,000 to $20,000,000. Id. at 277. The court then stated:
We know of no case where the use of the alternative not only wiped out the
expected profit but resulted in a loss some four or five times greater than
the expected profit and that was not found to be so excessive as to justify
the application of the impossibility doctrine.
Id.
,27 See Kull, supra note 66, at 33-34.

